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Abstract
Using spatial variations in the experience of war-related violence between 2007
and 2010 in Afghanistan, I estimate that birth rates are about eight percent
higher for households living in provinces affected by violence the most, thus,
an insurance effect may be present. The results remain robust after accounting
for migration as well as community level fixed effects and are more pronounced
for the poorest households but reverse in sign for the poor and middle class
households. Additionally, I find that stillbirths are more likely and more women
are currently pregnant in these provinces. These two fertility outcomes are
possible channels explaining increased birth rates in the provinces affected the
most by violence.
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1. Introduction
Households, and in particular women, in developing countries use children
as a coping mechanism to overcome times of crisis. Increasing the number of
children can be for instance an insurance mechanism to smooth consumption
over time or to replace children lost due to a crisis (Lee 1997, Nobles, Kim
and Prskawetz 2010, Frankenberg and Thomas 2015). These crises can include
earthquakes (Finlay 2009), weather shocks (Bertelli 2015) or tsunamis (Nobles,
Frankenberg and Thomas 2015), but also war. Yet, little is known about the
dynamics of war or war-like situations, e.g. armed conflicts, and their dynamics
on the effect of fertility and along with this birth rates.
So far, the research on the effect of war, and armed conflicts in general,
on fertility is limited and quite often focuses only on macroeconomic trends
in fertility (Grabill (1944), Blanc (2004), Urdal and Che (2013), and Cetorelli
(2014 ), ignoring possible effects at the micro level, e.g. the household level
and the decision of women to get more or less children. However, a notable
exception can be found in Agadjanian and Prata (2002). Their work is also my
motivation to fill this possible research gap.
To fill this gap, I focus on household level effects of a particular crisis, the
war in Afghanistan and how this negative shock to the livelihoods of households
affects birth rates of women experiencing more violence in their daily lives than
women experiencing less violence.
The war on terror in Afghanistan is an unique example, given that the shock
is not a one-time idiosyncratic shock, but experienced over a longer period of
time. Women could adapt to these circumstances and thus have time to change
their fertility preferences. They could also form more informed expectations
about the years to come and find other channels on how to cope with the war
surrounding their daily routines. In this light, the effect on fertility does not
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have to be as straightforward, and could range from a negative, a positive or
even an insignificant effect of war on birth rates. In identifying households (and
women) more affected by the violence in Afghanistan, I estimate a causal effect
of war on birth rates and thus further the understanding of fertility consequences
of armed conflicts.
I find that women living in provinces (e.g. Kabul, Kandahar) more affected
by violence than provinces less affected by violence, do have a higher birth rate
by about eight percent. The effect remains significant and similar in magni-
tude after controlling for migration (e.g. internal displacement) and is more
pronounced for the poorest households. To cope with the violence households
decide to get more children which could be used to support the current house-
hold income or to insure against a future loss in income or even children (e.g.
hoarding). In support of the insurance motive is the finding that still births are
more likely in high war intensity provinces and that at the time of the survey
more women are pregnant in the provinces.
My paper is organized as follows. A brief literature follows in section 2.
In section 3, I discuss the data, my identification strategy and my empirical
model. In section 4, I present my main results and perform robustness checks
and further explore the effect of war on fertility related outcomes. The paper
concludes in section 5.
2. Related work
The work on fertility responses to war (or crisis in general) in developing
countries can be broadly divided into studies discussing overall macro fertility
trends and studies analyzing the response to these shocks at the micro household
level and focus on coping mechanisms and individual fertility responses.
One of the first studies is from Grabill (1944) focusing on US birth rates during war.
Since then, the impact of war in developed countries is well researched, however less has been
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Studies on the effect of war on fertility trends can be found in Blanc (2004),
Urdal and Che (2013) and Cetorelli (2014). They find that fertility rates decline
compared to prewar periods and start to increase after a war ended, e.g. a
wartime gap. Though, macro studies typically ignore possible effects during the
war on fertility and sometimes do not include any control variables and just use
overall fertility rates (Blanc 2014). Exceptions can be found in Urdal and Che
(2013) and Cetorelli (2014).
Urdal and Che (2013) compare wars at a global level and use country level
data for the time period 1970 to 2005. This includes country level variables
such as battle related deaths to explain the effect of war on fertility. Cetorelli
(2014) estimates fertility rates based on household data and uses these predicted
fertility rates to describe a fertility decline during the Iraq war compared with
the period before. However, this approach assumes the war experience was
uniform across the entire country during the 2003 Iraq war.
Yet, these trends cannot explain decisions made at the household level and
ignore possible differences in the experience of war across regions or provinces
within a country. An exception to the work cited above can be found in Agad-
janian and Prata (2002). Agadjanian and Prata account for variations in the
war experience within a country in defining two very broad regions in Angola.
They also use household level data to estimate an effect of the war on fertility
outcomes. Their work is related to my study design. My goal is to explore
the variations in the Afghan war experience across provinces to identify house-
holds more affected by the war in Afghanistan than others. Instead of just
assuming a region experienced more war, I use actual conflict event data to
identify smaller geographical units (e.g. provinces) experiencing more violence
done for developing countries where most armed conflicts has been taking place since the end
of the Cold War.
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than other provinces.
3. Data, descriptive statistics, identification and empirical strategy
3.1. Data and descriptive statistics
I am utilizing the 2010 Afghanistan Mortality Survey (AMS) for my analysis.
The AMS is the first comprehensive household survey for Afghanistan including
background information on mothers and the living situation of the households
as well as a complete birth and mortality history of the children. It is nationally
representative including all 34 provinces, even the provinces affected highly by
violence. Women of reproductive age (age 12 to 49) who are usual residents
were interviewed. In total 24,000 households are in the sample which results in
48,190 women for my empirical models.
In Table 1, I show basic overall descriptive statistics at the household level. I
already define regions more affected by the violence than others. A discussion of
how I identify and define these provinces follows shortly after. A few noteworthy
points are already visible in these averages. First, Afghan women have almost
no education at all given a destructive Taliban rule undermining and narrowing
the role of women (Skaine 2001). Second, Afghan households are very poor on
the average and third, because of the war, the marriage rates and fertility rates
are relatively low and surprisingly uniform across the entire country. However,
overall averages can mask developments over time and at the province level.
Thus, in Figure 2 I show crude birth rates per women from 2007 to 2010 and
across provinces. Given that there has been no population census since 1979
for the country, I define crude birth rates as children born in a given year and
province divided by the sample size of the province. I then average these rates
over regions. It can already be seen that fertility rates varies across the regions
with slightly higher rates actually in the regions more affected by violence.
Though, these trends still mask developments at the province level and therefore,
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I show birth rates for the provinces from 2007 to 2010 in Figure 1. Here, the
picture is not as clear and province individual developments are present and
should be generally accounted for.
[Table 1 about here]
[Figure 1 about here]
[Figure 2 about here]
3.2. Identification strategy
Above I showed that birth rates are different across provinces and vary over
time. To actually estimate a causal effect of war on birth outcomes, I need to
identify provinces affected more by violence than others. Previous studies as-
sume that the entire war experience is uniform across an entire country, however,
armed conflicts vary in their intensity spatially and over time. I use event data
on violent events to show these variations and base my identification of provinces
on these event data. I utilize data published by the UN (UNAMA 2016) and
USAID (USAID 2016) and visualize civilian victims dead and injured across
the provinces and over the years 2007 to 2010 in Figure 3. Violence does vary
over time but is also concentrated in some provinces, e.g. Kabul and Kandahar,
the provinces with the government present but also US troops (Nato 2016), the
proclaimed enemy of the Taliban (Mcnally and Bucala 2015). Insurgents (and
terrorist) in general tend to target the facilities of their enemies as well as the
local authorities supported by these (Kalvyas 2006). With the underlying event
data, I define provinces as high and very high intensity provinces to compare
fertility outcomes with provinces having less or even no incidences of violence at
all. Provinces with a high intensity of violence have more than 400 incidences
per year, while provinces with very high level levels of violence have more than
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1,000 incidences per year.
[Figure 3 about here]
3.3. Empirical strategy
My goal is to estimate a local average treatment effect of the war in Afghanistan
on birth outcomes. To do so, I identify provinces, and therefore households and
women living in these households, more affected by the war than others. Thus,
I estimate a linear probability difference in difference model in the following
fashion. Similar approaches can be found in Agadjanian and Prata 2002, Fin-
lay 2009, and Bertelli 2015 to estimate the impact of an exogenous shock on
individual fertility outcomes:
Birthij = α+ γWarij + β1Xij + β2Motherij + β3SESij + τ + ij (1)
Birth is the outcome variable of interest and defined as one if a mother i living
in province j had at least one child during 2007 and 2010 and zero otherwise.
Given that I argue that identifying provinces more affected by war than others
based on actual data on violence is an improvement to previous studies, I limit
my analysis do this time frame, e.g. where I have actual and sufficient event
data on violence for a proper identification. It would also be possible to use birth
outcomes before 2007 but then I can only assume a uniform war experience for
the entire country for that period.
The variable War is my treatment variable and defined as one if a province
was more affected by war during the entire period 2007 to 2010. For provinces
This includes the following provinces: Kunduz, Paktia, Paktika, Uruzgan, Hilmand,
Zabul, Kunar, Nangahar, Kabul, and Khost as high intensity and Kunar, Kabul, Khost,
and Nanga- har as very high intensity.
6
less or not affected it takes the value zero. A binary treatment variable allows
the interpretation of a local average treatment effect of war on birth outcomes.
The vector X includes information on child mortality and parity (e.g. the
number of children) which could explain fertility preferences. To avoid potential
endogeneity issues between current fertility outcomes and current child mortal-
ity, I define child mortality as one if a child died before 2007. This also assumes
that women do not replace their children immediately but likely within then
nearer future. However, I am aware that children who died during the same
period could be a better explanation for changing fertility preferences. Nobles,
Frankenberg und Thomas (2015) use current child mortality but assume their
is no endogeneity and likely estimate a possibly biased model. Though, given
data limitations it is sometimes not possible to deal with the endogeneity issue
at hand and thus, I use previous child mortality to avoid issues of endogeneity
in my models.
The variable Mother includes information on the age (and age square), edu-
cation and if the woman is married or not while the socio-economic status SES
includes characteristics on the household itself.
The parameter τ includes community level fixed effects, e.g. to account for
developments and ties present at the local community level. I have roughly 724
communities (e.g. clusters) in my dataset. Nobles, Frankenberg and Thomas
(2015) show that for the tsunami in Indonesia community ties, e.g. helping each
other after the aftermath in the process of rebuilding, are a major determinant
in easing the consequences of a crisis. It safe to assume that in a tribe-based
society as the Afghan society one is, households aid and assist each other. This
A possible instrument to explain current child mortality but not current fertility levels,
could be low birth weight or size of the child. Birth circumstances have been linked to later
health and, thus, mortality outcomes (Case, Fertig, and Paxson 2005). However, these data
are quite often not available in data sets from conflict regions.
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can be even more pronounced in Afghanistan, given that a war-like situation
has been overshadowing the lives of people since the 1979 Soviet invasion.
Finally,  is a clustered standard error term and actually clustered at the
community level. Given that there are 724 community cluster the standard
errors should be unbiased. Alternatively, clustering (and using fixed effects) at
the province level would also been an option. However, I showed above that
developments in provinces likely show a temporal dimension, I cannot account
for in a simple cross-section of households.
4. Results
4.1. Main results
My main results are shown in Table 2. I present baseline models without
the treatment variable war and models with the treatment variable war for
high and very high intensity provinces. Furthermore, I show results for the
same models including province dummy variables accounting for time invariant
characteristics specific to these provinces.
Before turning to the discussion of the war variable, I discuss the baseline
models already showing some noteworthy results remaining robust after the
inclusion of my treatment variable. First, the main predictor for higher birth
outcomes is actually the marital status, and with this the risk of pregnancy. In
light, that more than 97 percent of the husbands live at home, it is not surprising
that being married increases births. However, what is surprising, is the low rate
of marriage with roughly 50 percent, mainly due to the war and many men
not available for marriage. Second, variables describing the living situation of
the households, e.g. living in urban areas or the wealth level, have limited
explanatory power. Thus, I explore the role of the socio-economic status of the
household later to further explore where the significant effect of my treatment
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variable is coming from. I suspect that households with a different wealth status
can cope differently with the experience of violence.
Third, variables typically explaining fertility and birth outcomes, e.g the age
of the mother and her education, have the expected signs and are significant.
Older mothers have lower birth outcomes on the average, as well as mothers
with more education. Though, the result should be seen in perspective, given
that most women have no education at all and if, just one year of education at
most. Previous child mortality has no effect on current birth outcomes, and a
replacement effect may not be present.
Thus, I attribute the positive effect of war on birth outcomes mainly on what
Lee (1997) describes as an insurance effect. Women may get more children be-
cause their risk of dying in the future is higher in the provinces experiencing most
of the violence in Afghanistan. I find that birth outcomes in these provinces are
roughly eight percent higher than in provinces experiencing less or no violence
at all. The effect is stronger in magnitude for provinces experiencing very high
levels of violence and thus a likely higher perceived risk of child mortality.
[Table 2 about here]
However, the level of household wealth can be a channel possibly affecting the
effect of war on fertility. Rich households cope differently than very poor house-
holds in times of crisis because they possess more and better resources and are
usually also better educated (Kim and Prskawetz 2010). Thus, in Table 3, I
explore the effect of the war on different wealth quintiles ranging from very
poor to very rich. I find that households respond differently to the experience
An alternative term could be hoarding as in Nobles, Frankenberg and Duncan 2015.
Hoarding of children takes place when parents expect their children have a higher risk of
dying because of the household situation.
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of violence. The war has almost no effect on rich households but a pronounced
effect on the poor households. These may respond with having more children
on the average. However, the effect is not as clear because the fixed effects
regression show a different sign, e.g. the former positive effect on birth rates
becomes negative. However, I tend to prefer the results with fixed effects, given
it accounts of a possible omitted variable bias between the treatment variable
and province effects. Nonetheless, the households in the middle of the wealth
distribution have less births because of the war, e.g. the may possess enough re-
sources to counteract negative consequences of the war and do not need children
as a possible coping mechanism.
[Table 3 about here]
4.2. Robustness checks
In this section I explore the effect of war on fertility outcomes further and
account for issues typically concerning the validity of results in the work with
household data from developing countries. These issues can include possible
migration (e.g. internal displacement) because of the armed conflict and data
issues.
A typical issue affecting results can be internal displacement because it can
change the composition of the household interviewed. Usually, families seek
safer places in times of war, e.g. moving to refugee camps or to relatives in
areas with less violence. In Afghanistan most internally displaced persons move
to informal camps but also very limited to relatives (UNHCR 2008, IDMC 2016).
This can affect the results because household surveys ask the members present
During the time period covered in the AMS 2010 roughly 150,000 to 300,000 persons were
internally displaced (UNHCR 2008). This number started to increase after 2010 to one million
in 2015 (IDMC 2016).
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in the household at the time of the interview. To remedy this problem, I use
information on how long the members of the households have been living in
this particular household. The composition of my sample is almost not affected.
I still find a positive effect on birth outcomes but the coefficients lose their
significance for households living in high intensity areas. Results are reported
in Table 4.
[Table 4 about here]
Finally, data concerns can be an issue, e.g. if it is too unsafe to conduct inter-
views in certain areas, interviewers may fill out questionnaires and turn in these
fraudulent questionnaires. Hill (2012) argues this may be an issue for the South
of Afghanistan. In Table 5, I do exclude these potential regions. However, with
my underlying event data in mind, these regions are not the regions with the
most violence but my base for comparison. Excluding these regions decreases
the sample size and furthermore changes the results. In my case the previous
significant effect of the war on fertility loses its statistical significance.
[Table 5 about here]
4.3. A few more channels to fertility
In this section, I explore if the war in Afghanistan affects other additional
channels related to fertility. These channels could include the number of still-
births and whether women are currently pregnant. Those two outcomes are
typically affected by exogenous shocks, e.g. by the deterioration of the living
and health situation, and thus maternal health, and the change in the demand
for children. If maternal health reduces because of the war, I do expect that
stillbirths should be negatively affected by the experience of violence. Further-
more, I also expect that more women are currently pregnant in the province
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more affected by the war if an insurance effect is present. I use the same models
as above but change the outcome variable to explore these channels. Results
for the treatment variable War are presented in Table 6.
I find that women in provinces more affected by violence are more likely to
be currently, e.g. in 2010, pregnant. This reflects the development that violence
against civilians started to increase substantially since 2007 and women could
demand more children as an insurance against a future loss of children.
Additionally, I estimate a treatment effect of the war on a specific birth out-
come: stillbirths. Stillbirths are usually closely related to maternal health and
the living situation of the household but also to stress experienced during preg-
nancy (Camacho 2008) . However, there are reportedly (Coleman and Lemmon
2011) significant improvements in the health system in Afghanistan, especially
in regions highly affected by war because they also attract more development
aid. This particularly includes Kabul, the capital where many aid agencies are
present. In this light, stress experienced because of the war may be one channel
left affecting this particular birth outcome. Yet, I find that stillbirths are less
likely in provinces affected highly by violence but more likely in provinces with
very high level of violence. Even if maternal health improved the negative effect
of the war outweighs the positive effect of improved maternal health. The higher
risk of having a still birth in these provinces can also explain why more women
are currently pregnant in these provinces, because of an insurance mechanism
present (Lee 1997).
[Table 6 about here]
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5. Conclusion
Households experiencing negative shocks like weather shocks and other nat-
ural disasters, do cope differently with the negative consequences of a particular
crisis. An armed conflict is another form of a negative shock. Consequences of
experiencing armed conflicts is the loss of consumption and assets or even family
members like children. A possible response is to change the fertility preference
because of the crisis. However, the fertility response can range from reducing the
demand for children to increasing the demand for children, depending on other
resources available to compensate the negative consequences (Lee 1997). I am
using the case of Afghanistan to further the understanding of fertility responses
to armed conflicts, a form of crisis, yet, less researched so far.
I find that women tend to have more children on the average in areas more
affected by the war experience in Afghanistan. In utilizing the 2010 Afghan
Mortality Survey (AMS), I shed light on the household fertility decision be-
cause most of the previous work focuses only on (macro) fertility trends and
compare outcomes before and after war. However, from a policy point of view
understanding the fertility response at the household level helps designing bet-
ter aid projects for the households affected the most by armed conflicts and
external shocks in general.
My finding is mainly driven by the response of the poor households which
increase their fertility likely to insure against future loss of children (e.g. hoard-
ing) or get children as additional labor in the household production to increase
household consumption. Limiting to my analysis is that I have no information
on actual consumption patterns and I can only analyze a cross section of women.
Still, I make use of the birth history given in the AMS and a novel event data
set on violent incidences across provinces and over the years 2007 to 2010 to
identify provinces more affected by violence than other provinces.
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Figure 1: Crude birth rates from 2007 to 2010
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Figure 2: Crude birth rates across provinces - 2007 to 2010
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics - AMS 2010
All Low intensity High intensity
Current age mother 24.39 24.25 24.49
No education 73.33% 72.20 % 74.85 %
Currently married 54.05% 54.90 % 52.90%
Children ever born 4.34 4.34 4.34
Children dead 21.49% 25.51% 15.83%
Current age child 10.96 10.85 11.10
Boys 53.22% 52.39% 54.38%
Currently pregnant 18.07 % 16.67 % 20.02 %
Urban 31.26 % 25.88 % 38.52 %
Unprotected water source 23.08% 24.02% 19.46%
Electricity 48.12% 51.48% 43.59%
Refrigerator 11.85% 11.41% 12.41%
Intensity refers to the number of civilians dead in a province. I sum these provinces up to low and
high intensity regions. Provinces with a high intensity of violence have more than 400 incidences
per year, while provinces with very high level levels of violence have more than 1,000 incidences
per year.
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Table 2: Birth outcomes - DiD regressions
Variables Baseline High intensity Very high intensity
War .0042 .0857*** .0126 .2582***
(.0088) (.0013) ( .0076) (.0019)
Age .0445*** .0458*** .0445*** .0458*** .0445*** .0458***
( .0018) ( .0011) ( .0018) (.0011) (.0018) (.0011)
Age Squared -.0010*** -.0010*** -.0010*** -.0010*** -.0010*** -.0010***
(.0000) (.0000) ( .0000) ( .0000) ( .0000) ( .0000)
Education -.0209*** -.0190*** -.0205*** -.0190*** -.0209*** -.0190***
(.0037) (.0042) (.0035) ( .0042) ( .0037) (.0042)
Parity .0771*** .0741*** .0770*** .0741*** .0769*** .0741***
( .0037) (.0022) (.0036) ( .0022) ( .0036) ( .0022)
Child Mortality .0068 .0045 .0071 .0045 .0078 .0045
( .0147) (.0130) (.0149) (.0130) ( .0145) ( .0130)
Urban -.0027 .0626*** -.0026 -.0230*** -.0031 -.4649***
( .0069) (.0065) ( .0072) ( .0061) (.0081) (.0021)
Married .5603*** .5596*** .5604*** .5596*** .5606*** .5596***
( .0077) (.0061) ( .0077) ( .0061) (.0077) (.0061)
Poor -.0021 .0190*** .0000 .0190*** .0026 .0190***
(.0069) ( .0061) (.0069) ( .0061) (.0068) (.0061)
Community FE no yes no yes no yes
N 48190 48190 48190 48190 48190 48190
R2 0.51 0.53 0.51 0.53 0.51 0.53
.
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the community level and are shown in parentheses. *
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Provinces with a high intensity of violence have more than 400
incidences per year, while provinces with very high level levels of violence have more than 1,000
incidences per year.
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Table 4: Robustness check - Accounting for migration
Variables Baseline Migration f.e.
High intensity .0042 .0115 .1172***
( .0088) ( .0096) (.0060)
N 48190 38987 38987
R2 0.51 0.56 0.58
Very high intensity .0126 .0168** .1310***
(.0076) (.0074) (.0012)
N 48190 38987 38987
R2 0.51 0.56 0.58
.
Notes: To conserve space, I only report results for the war variable. Standard errors are clustered
at the community level and are shown in parentheses. Migration (internal displacement) is not
present if the household member interviewed has been living in the same household for more than
five years. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 5: Robustness check - Data issues - Excluding the South
Variables Whole country Without South f.e. Without South II f.e.
High intensity .0042 -.0079 .0882*** -.0006 .0873***
( .0088) ( .0115) (.0015) ( .0085) (.0014)
N 48190 30117 30117 37826 37826
R2 0.51 0.51 0.53 0.52 0.53
Very high intensity .0126 .0042 .2593*** .0086 .2596***
(.0076) (.0062) (.0022) ( .0063) ( .0020)
N 48190 30117 30117 37826 37826
R2 0.51 0.51 0.53 0.52 0.53
.
Notes: To conserve space, I only report results for the war variable. Standard errors are clustered
at the province level and are shown in parentheses. I exclude the South (region and provinces). *
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 6: Currently pregnant and stillbirths
Variables High intensity f.e. Very high intensity f.e.
Currently pregnant .0341** .1838*** .0144 .1838***
(.0149) (.0031) (.0072) (.0031)
N 25478 25478 25478 25478
R2 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.11
Stillbirths -.0088 -.0151** -.0148 .0515***
( .0131) (.0072) ( .0151) (.0027)
N 15614 15614 15614 15614
R2 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.08
.
Notes: To conserve space, I only report results for the war variable. Standard errors are clustered
at the province level and are shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Provinces
with a high intensity of violence have more than 400 incidences per year, while provinces with
very high level levels of violence have more than 1,000 incidences per year.
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Appendix A. Underlying data for the GIS maps
Table A1: Crude birth rates (CBR) by provinces and year.
Province 2007 2008 2009 2010
Kabul 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.04
Kapisa 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.07
Parwan 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.07
Wardak 0.16 0.17 0.11 0.02
Logar 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.11
Nangarhar 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.07
Laghman 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.10
Panjsher 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.11
Baghlan 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.09
Bamyan 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.10
Ghazni 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.11
Paktika 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.04
Paktya 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.07
Khost 0.15 0.15 0.09 0.05
Kunar 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.09
Nuristan 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.09
Badakhsha 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.08
Takhar 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.10
Kunduz 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.07
Samangan 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.05
Balkh 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.08
Sari pul 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.09
Ghor 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11
Daykundi 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.05
Urozgan 0.18 0.22 0.19 0.19
Zabul 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.09
Kandahar 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.10
Jawzjan 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.06
Faryab 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.09
Helmand 0.11 0.16 0.11 0.07
Badghis 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.09
Herat 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.07
Farah 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.09
Nimroz 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06
Crude birth rates per women and year. The birth rate is defined as the number of children born in
a given year divided by the sample population, given their is no current population census. The
last official population census was 1979. Own calculations based on the AMS (2010).
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Table A2: Incidences of Violence
province 2007 2008 2009 2010
Badakhshan 51 97 86 125
Badghis 4 153 258 383
Baghlan 59 215 244 368
Balkh 0 123 128 268
Bamyan 0 62 59 34
Daykundi 0 44 98 70
Farah 81 210 257 356
Faryab 0 97 203 353
Ghazni 83 431 547 1,178
Ghor 3 84 110 133
Hilmand 668 972 1,240 2,498
Hirat 40 232 371 496
Jawzjan 0 44 74 71
Kabul 342 618 865 539
Kandahar 393 1,746 2,151 2,512
Kapisa 17 129 325 168
Khost 215 624 710 876
Kunar 198 479 580 725
Kunduz 45 144 343 674
Laghman 37 135 172 110
Logar 26 148 187 256
Maydan Wardak 25 242 311 417
Nangarhar 121 563 682 862
Nimroz 12 330 249 246
Nuristan 45 65 64 108
Paktika 0 283 345 619
Paktya 240 264 266 513
Panjsher 0 1 8 5
Parwan 14 203 143 100
Samangan 0 20 12 18
Sari Pul 0 8 22 49
Takhar 16 52 103 256
Uruzgan 210 360 544 524
Zabul 81 511 528 622
Sum 3,026 7,945 8,897 10,350
Base for the GIS map in the text. Sources are the UNAMA 2007 to 2010 reports and USAID
(2016).
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